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A Noise and Signal Alignment Approach
Zhou Li and Hua Sun
Abstract
In the conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) problem, Alice and Bob (each holds an input
and a common secret) wish to disclose, as efficiently as possible, the secret to Carol if and only
if their inputs satisfy some function. The capacity of CDS is the maximum number of bits of
the secret that can be securely disclosed per bit of total communication. We characterize the
necessary and sufficient condition for the extreme case where the capacity of CDS is the highest
and is equal to 1/2. For the simplest instance where the capacity is smaller than 1/2, we show
that the linear capacity is 2/5.
Zhou Li (email: zhouli@my.unt.edu) and Hua Sun (email: hua.sun@unt.edu) are with the Department of Electrical
Engineering at the University of North Texas.
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1 Introduction
In a seminal work [1], Shannon introduced the notion of perfect security (also known as information
theoretic security) based on statistical independence and established the fundamental limits of a
single-user secure communication system. While [1] provided an elegant theoretical foundation for
cryptography, the optimal solutions are deemed too inefficient to implement in practice [2]. Cryp-
tographers therefore relax the stringent requirement of perfect security to computational security,
defined based on indistinguishability with limited computation power. Most existing commercial
security protocols are built on computational security.
Modern secure communication systems naturally involve multiple users. Interestingly, for multi-
user secure communication systems, solutions based on perfect security are not necessarily less
efficient when compared to those based on computational security (e.g., see [3] for a specific context
of private information retrieval). As such, there is much potential for perfect security in multi-user
networks, especially considering the fact that multi-user security protocols based on both perfect
and computational security criteria are primarily studied in academia and large-scale practical
implementations are still rare. It is thus imperative to understand the fundamental limits of
perfect security in multi-user networks, which has been studied in the cryptography and theoretical
computer science communities [4], although typically not using information theoretic tools. Due to
the increasing importance of security in modern communication systems, it has also recently become
one of the focuses for the information theory community [5–7], where both classical cryptography
formulations are studied [8–13] and new models are introduced [14–18]. The goal of this paper is
to use information theoretic tools to study a canonical theoretical computer science problem (i.e.,
a cryptographic primitive) - conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) [19–21].
In the CDS problem (see Fig. 1), Alice and Bob hold inputs x and y respectively, in addition
to a common secret S. Alice and Bob wish to disclose the secret S to Carol if their inputs x, y
satisfy some function f , i.e., when f(x, y) = 1. Otherwise f(x, y) = 0, absolute no information is
revealed to Carol in the information theoretic sense. A common noise variable Z is available to
Alice and Bob to assist the task, while Carol is fully ignorant of Z. Alice and Bob send signals Ax
and By respectively to Carol. The aim is to find an efficient communication protocol, i.e., we wish
to minimize the number of bits contained in Ax and By.
Alice has x; S; Z Bob has y; S; Z
Carol has x; y
Ax By
learns S i¸ f(x; y) = 1
x; y 2 f1; 2; 3g
f(x; y) = 1 i¸ x` y 2 f0; 1g
1) 2)
A1 B1
A2 B2
A3 B3
Figure 1: 1). The CDS problem. 2) An example of f(x, y) represented by a bipartite graph. Nodes in the
left (right) column are the signals from Alice (Bob) for various input values. From pair of nodes connected
by a solid black edge (i.e., f(x, y) = 1), Carol can decode S; from pair of nodes connected by a dashed red
edge (i.e., f(x, y) = 0), Carol learns nothing about S.
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1.1 Motivation
The CDS problem is a minimal model that captures the challenges of characterizing the commu-
nication cost of security in multi-user networks. Note that if there is no security constraint, the
problem is trivial as either Alice or Bob may directly send the secret to Carol. However, once the
security constraint is included, the optimal communication cost of the CDS problem immediately
becomes one of the notable open problems in information theoretic cryptography [22]. Further, con-
sidering that there are only three users in the CDS problem, we find it to be a simplest intriguing
theoretical model and are interested in understanding its fundamental communication limits.
Beyond the theoretical value, the CDS problem is also relevant in modeling several interesting
secure communication scenarios. One may interpret x and y as the queries sent from the user
Carol to two distributed non-communicating servers, Alice and Bob, respectively. The signals
Ax and By are the answers from the servers that enable the user to obtain the desired data, S.
The security condition of f(x, y) = 1 is to ensure that data retrieval is successful if the queries are
qualified while for unqualified queries, nothing is revealed. Note that the distributed servers are non-
communicating so that Alice only knows x and Bob only knows y. We then need a mechanism for
Alice and Bob to produce answers without knowing the other query. In fact, the CDS problem was
introduced first in the context of symmetric private information retrieval [19], exactly motivated by
this need of providing distributed data access service with protection under unqualified (malicious)
queries. Another interesting application may be seen as follows. Alice and Bob wish to share the
secret (e.g., a business plan) with Carol if and only if they wish to collaborate, and f(x, y) captures
the condition under which they agree to collaborate.
From a different perspective, the CDS problem could be viewed as a secure data storage system
over a bipartite graph (see Fig. 1.2). The nodes in the graph are the storage variables and there
are two types of edges, where from the pair of nodes connected by one type of edge, the secret
is recoverable and otherwise, from the other type of edge, no information is disclosed. As such,
the CDS problem is meant to provide fine-grained access control for encrypted data, where the
access structure1 may be very diverse depending on the underlying graph (i.e., f(x, y)). For other
applications of CDS, we refer to [20,21,24,25] and references therein.
1.2 Comparison to Previous Approach
In cryptography and theoretical computer science communities, the typical formulation of the CDS
problem is as follows [19–22,24–26].
• The secret S has 1 bit. The communication cost (i.e., the number of bits in Ax, By) is
measured as order functions of the input size (the logarithm of the number of possibilities of
inputs x, y). So the studied question is - how does the communication cost of disclosing a
one-bit secret scale with the complexity of the function f(x, y)?
1It is interesting to compare CDS with a related problem secret sharing [23], where a secret is distributed over
multiple nodes in a way that if and only if a set of nodes belong to certain pre-defined sets, the secret can be
reconstructed. The main difference is that for secret sharing, either perfect reconstruction or zero leakage is guaranteed
for any set of nodes. In contrast, the access structure of CDS is much sparser. For example, for nodes on the same
side of the bipartite graph (e.g., A1, A2, A3 in Fig. 1.2), no condition is placed, i.e., they may or may not be sufficient
to recover the secret or part of the secret. Note that this sparsity is an important distinction, e.g., we will develop
an alignment view to CDS in this paper, while an alignment view to secret sharing is not available yet. In addition,
qualified sets in CDS only have 2 nodes while any number of nodes is allowed in secret sharing.
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• Implicit to the above formulation is that the proposed protocols must work for all functions
f(x, y). In other words, the considered setting is the worst case scenario that targets at the
most challenging f(x, y).
In contrast, in this work we will take a Shannon theoretic formulation.
• We allow the secret size to scale to infinity while the function f(x, y) is fixed. Our metric is
the communication rate, which is defined as the ratio of the secret size to the number of bits
communicated to Carol. So our question is - what is the maximum number of bits that can
be secretly disclosed, per bit of total communication?
• Regarding the function f(x, y), we are interested in the instance optimal setting, i.e., for a
fixed instance of f(x, y), what is the optimal communication strategy?
1.3 Main Contribution and Technique
In this work, we mainly consider the best cases of f(x, y), i.e., when the communication rate is the
highest. As long as the security constraint is not empty for any input value (i.e., for any x (y),
there exist some y (x) such that f(x, y) = 0), the size of Ax, By cannot be smaller than the secret
size (as each of Ax and By must be independent of the secret by itself). For all such non-degenerate
cases, the rate cannot be larger than 1/2, because to disclose 1 bit of the secret, both Alice and Bob
must communicate 1 bit to Carol (then the total communication must be at least 2 bits). Our first
main result is a complete characterization of all instances of f(x, y) such that the capacity of CDS
is 1/2 (see Theorem 1). The characterization is stated in terms of the graph theoretic properties of
f(x, y). Our second main result is the linear capacity characterization of the simplest CDS instance
such that its capacity is smaller than 1/2 (see Theorem 2). Interestingly, once we go beyond the
best case of capacity 1/2, the problem becomes significantly more challenging and we are only able
to settle the linear capacity.
The main results are obtained using an alignment view of the CDS problem, which can be
viewed as generalizations and adaptations of interference alignment [27]. Interference alignment
originated in wireless networks [28, 29] and has been applied much beyond the wireless context,
e.g., to distributed storage repair [30–32], to network coding [33,34] and index coding [35,36], and
to private information retrieval [37, 38]. Interference alignment aims to let the multiple undesired
signal spaces overlap as much as possible, so as to maximize the number of dimensions left for the
desired signal. It is then obvious that in the CDS problem, we only have two objects - the secret S
and the noise Z, so there is no interference to say, not to mention multiple interferences. What we
develop in this work is a new look of the CDS problem from the perspective of the overlap of the
noise spaces and the signal spaces, i.e., noise alignment and signal alignment. Both the converse
results and achievable schemes are based on such an alignment argument.
2 Problem Statement
Consider a pair of inputs (x, y) from some set I ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , X}×{1, 2, · · · , Y }. Input x is available
to Alice and input y is available to Bob. Alice and Bob also both hold a secret S that is comprised
of L i.i.d. uniform symbols from a finite field Fp and an independent common noise variable Z that
is comprised of LZ i.i.d. uniform symbols from Fp. In p-ary units,
H(S) = L, H(Z) = LZ , H(S,Z) = H(S) +H(Z) = L+ LZ . (1)
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Alice and Bob wish to communicate the secret S to Carol if f(x, y) = 1, for a globally known
binary function f , defined over domain I. When f(x, y) = 0, zero information about S should be
revealed. To this end, Alice sends signal Ax and Bob sends signal By to Carol. Ax has LAx symbols
from Fp and By has LBy symbols from Fp. Ax and By are functions of S,Z, for all (x, y) ∈ I.
H(Ax, By|S,Z) = 0. (2)
From Ax, By, Carol can recover S with no error
2 if f(x, y) = 1, and otherwise f(x, y) = 0,
Ax, By must be independent of S. For all (x, y) ∈ I, we have
(Correctness) H(S|Ax, By) = 0, if f(x, y) = 1; (3)
(Security) H(S|Ax, By) = H(S), otherwise f(x, y) = 0. (4)
The collection of the mappings from x, y, S, Z to Ax, By as specified above is called a CDS scheme.
A signal rate tuple ( LLA1
, LLA2
, · · · , LLAX ,
L
LB1
, · · · , LLBY ) is said to be achievable if there exists a
CDS scheme, for which the correctness and security constraints (3), (4) are satisfied. The closure
of the set of all achievable signal rate tuples is called the capacity region C. The achievable
communication rate characterizes how many symbols of the secret are securely disclosed per symbol
of total communication and is defined with respect to the symmetric signal rate tuple as follows.
R =
L
2N
s.t. (
L
N
, · · · , L
N
) ∈ C. (5)
The supremum of achievable communicate rates is called the capacity of CDS, C.
The randomness rate specifies how many secret symbols are disclosed per noise symbol and is
defined as RZ =
L
LZ
. In this work, we focus mainly on the metric of capacity C and allow as much
noise as needed, i.e., the randomness rate is unconstrained.
2.1 Graph Representation of f(x, y)
The function f(x, y) can be equivalently specified by its characteristic undirected bipartite graph
Gf (V,E), defined as follows. The vertex set of Gf is comprised of all signals sent from Alice
and Bob, i.e., V = {A1, · · · , AX , B1, · · · , BY }. As the vertices and the signals have an invertbile
mapping, we use vertex and signal interchangeably in this paper. The edge set of Gf is comprised
of the unordered pairs {Ax, By} from the vertex set such that (x, y) ∈ I. The edges have two types,
t : E → {0, 1}. For the first type, {Ax, By} is a solid black edge and is referred to as a qualified edge
if f(x, y) = 1 and equivalently t(Ax, By) = 1; for the second type, {Ax, By} is a dashed red edge
and is referred to as a unqualified edge if f(x, y) = 0 and equivalently t(Ax, By) = 0 (see Fig. 1.2
for an example).
The following notions of the characteristic graph Gf will be used to state our results. We follow
standard graph theory terminologies (e.g., see [39]).
Definition 1 (Qualified/Unqualified Path) A sequence of distinct connecting qualified (un-
qualified) edges is called a qualified (unqualified) path.
For example, in Fig. 1.2, P = ({A1, B1}, {B1, A2}, {A2, B2}, {B2, A3}, {A3, B3}) is a qualified
path while P = ({B2, A1}, {A1, B3}, {B3, A2}) is an unqualified path. Note that a path can be
equivalently specified by a sequence of vertices or edges.
2The results of this work also hold under the -error framework.
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Definition 2 (Internal Qualified Edge) A qualified edge that connects two vertices in an un-
qualified path is called an internal qualified edge.
For example, consider the unqualified path P = ({B2, A1}, {A1, B3}, {B3, A2}) in Fig. 1.2, which
can be equivalently specified by a vertex sequence (B2, A1, B3, A2). The qualified edge {B2, A2} is
an internal qualified edge.
Definition 3 (Qualified Component) A qualified (connected) component is a maximal induced
subgraph of Gf such that any two vertices in the subgraph are connected by a qualified path.
In this work, to avoid degenerate settings and to simplify the presentation of results3, we restrict
ourselves to functions f(x, y) such that the security constraint (4) is not empty for any individual
x and any individual y.
Definition 4 (Non-degenerate Condition) A CDS instance, described by the characteristic
graph Gf (V,E) is called non-degenerate if for any vertex v ∈ V , there exists some vertex u ∈ V
such that {u, v} ∈ E is an unqualified edge.
3 Results
Our first main result is the necessary and sufficient condition for all CDS instances such that the
capacity is 1/2, stated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 The capacity of CDS is 1/2 if and only if within any qualified component, there is no
internal qualified edge in an unqualified path.
The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Section 4. Here to illustrate the idea, we give two
examples. For the first one, the half-rate feasibility condition is satisfied and rate 1/2 is achievable.
Example 1 Consider the CDS instance in Fig. 2.1, where the characteristic graph Gf has two
qualified components. Within qualified component a., there are 3 unqualified paths and none of
them has an internal qualified edge (see the blue circles in Fig. 2.2). Qualified component b. only
has one qualified edge and there is no unqualified path. Therefore, the half-rate feasibility condition
in Theorem 1 is satisfied and the scheme that achieves rate 1/2 is shown in Fig. 2.2.
For the scheme, every vertex in a qualified component uses the same noise variable and different
qualified components use independent noise variables (e.g., qualified components a. and b. use z1
and z2, respectively). Within a qualified component, we consider each unqualified component (a
maximal set of vertices where any two vertices are connected by an unqualified path) sequentially,
and assign each vertex in the unqualified component a linearly independent combination of the secret
and noise (e.g., the 3 unqualified components in a. are assigned s+ z1, s+ 2z1, s+ 3z1 respectively).
Note that a vertex that is not connected to any unqualified edge (within a qualified component) is a
(trivial) unqualified component (e.g., vertex B4 in qualified component b.).
The correctness constraint (3) holds because 1) any qualified edge belongs to a qualified compo-
nent (e.g., {A2, B2}), 2) the two vertices belong to different unqualified components (note that there
3Note that a degenerate setting can be converted to a non-degenerate one. Consider any vertex v that is connected
to only qualified edges. In other words, this vertex has no security constraint. Then we may set the signal v to be
the secret S and eliminate v. Repeating the same procedure for all such vertices, we have a non-degenerate setting.
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1) 2)
A1 B1
A2 B2
A3 B3
A4 B4
A1 B1 A3
B2
A2 B3
a:
b:
s+ z1
A4B4
s+ 2z1
s+ 3z1
s+ z2 s+ 2z2
Figure 2: 1). A CDS instance, described by its characteristic graph Gf . 2) The coding scheme that achieves
rate 1/2. The secret has 1 symbol s from F5, the noise variable has 2 independent symbols z1, z2 from F5,
and each signal has 1 symbol from F5. Gf contains two qualified components (denoted by a. and b.).
is no internal qualified edge, e.g., consider A2, B2), and 3) any distinct unqualified components are
assigned a linearly independent combination of secrete and noise, from which the secret can be suc-
cessfully recovered (e.g., A2 = s + 2z1, B2 = s + 3z1). We show that the security constraint (4) is
guaranteed as well. There are two cases. First, for unqualified edges within a qualified component
(e.g., {B1, A3}), they belong to the same unqualified component so that the same signal is assigned
and no information about the secret is revealed (e.g., B1 = A3 = s + z1). Second, for unqualified
edges across two qualified components (e.g., {B2, A4}), different noise variables are used so that
again nothing about the secret is leaked (e.g., B2 = s+ 3z1, A4 = s+ 2z2).
For the second example, the condition in Theorem 1 is violated such that rate 1/2 is not
achievable. We use the CDS instance in Fig. 1 as the second example (reproduced in Fig. 3).
A1 B1
A2 B2
A3 B3
z0; z1; z2; z3; z4 z1; z2; z3; z4; z5
z2; z3; z4; z5; z6 z3; z4; z5; z6; z7
z4; z5; z6; z7; z8 z5; z6; z7; z8; z0
s1 s2 s3 s4
+ + + +
s1 s2 s3 s4 s1
+ + + + +
s1
+
s2 s3s4 s1
+ + + +
s4 s1
+ +
Figure 3: A CDS instance that has an internal qualified edge {B2, A2} in an unqualified path (B2, A1, B3, A2)
within a qualified component Gf , and the achievable scheme of rate 2/5. The secret has L = 4 bits,
s1, s2, s3, s4, the noise has LZ = 9 independent uniform bits, z0, z1, · · · , z8, and each signal has N = 5 bits.
The rate achieved is R = L/(2N) = 2/5.
Example 2 Consider the CDS instance in Fig. 3, where the characteristic graph Gf is a qualified
component. The unqualified path (B2, A1, B3, A2) contains an internal qualified edge {B2, A2},
so the half-rate feasibility condition in Theorem 1 is violated and rate 1/2 is not achievable. An
intuitive explanation by contradiction is as follows.
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Suppose rate 1/2 is achievable, then the size of each signal Ax, By that is connected to a qualified
edge must be N = L symbols and the noise appeared in the signal has size L symbols as well (see
Lemma 1 in Section 4.1). For any qualified edge, the noise variables for the two signals must be the
same to ensure that the secret can be decoded, i.e., the noise space must fully overlap (see Lemma 2
for a proof). For example, in Fig. 3 A2, B2 must use the same noise. Then by sub-modularity, full
noise alignment must hold for any qualified component, i.e., all signals in a qualified component must
use the same noise variables (see Lemma 3). For example, in Fig. 3 A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3 must use
the same noise. Next, consider any unqualified edge, given that the noise space is fully overlapped,
the signal space must fully overlap to avoid leaking information about the secret (see Lemma 4). For
example, B2 must be equal to A1 in Fig. 3. Similarly by sub-modularity, for any unqualified path
within a qualified component, the signal spaces must fully overlap (see Lemma 5). For example, in
Fig. 3 we must have B2 = A1 = B3 = A2 for the unqualified path (B2, A1, B3, A2). Finally, the
presence of an internal qualified edge {B2, A2} results in a contradiction, because B2 = A2 and B2
is independent of the secret so that the edge {B2, A2} cannot be qualified.
Note that rate 1/2 is the highest for all non-degenerate settings as each vertex v has at least
one unqualified edge and the size of v cannot be smaller than the secret size, i.e., N ≥ L and
R = L/(2N) ≤ 1/2. As the half-rate feasibility condition is fully settled, we proceed to scenarios
where rate 1/2 is not achievable. Interestingly, the simplest such instance is that in Fig. 3. This
6-node CDS instance is the simplest in the sense that for any 5-node non-degenerate CDS instance,
half-rate feasibility condition is satisfied (easy to verify). Our second main result is the linear
capacity characterization of the CDS instance in Fig. 3, stated in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 The linear capacity of the CDS instance shown in Fig. 3 is 2/5.
The achievable scheme is shown in Fig. 3, where the secret has L = 4 bits, S = (s1, s2, s3, s4),
and the noise has LZ = 9 independent uniform bits, Z = (z0, z1, · · · , z8). Each signal has N = 5
bits and is shown in Fig. 3. Note that along the qualified path (A1, B1, A2, B2, A3, B3), every two
connected vertices share 4 noise bits in a consecutive manner, i.e., A1 uses z0, z1, z2, z3, z4, and B1
uses z1, z2, z3, z4, z5 etc. The secret bits are assigned such that for any unqualified edge, the same
noise bits are combined with the same secret bits (e.g., see the blue circles with the same shape
in Fig. 3. For the unqualified edge {B1, A3}, both vertices use z4, z5 so that the same signal bits
s4 + z4, z5 are present).
The rate achieved is R = L/(2N) = 2/5. Both correctness and security constraints are easy to
verify. For example, consider the qualified edge {B1, A2}. Considering the part of the signal that
uses the same noise z2, z3, z4, z5, we may recover (s1 + s2, s2 + s3, s3 + s4, s4), from which we can
decode S = (s1, s2, s3, s4). Consider the unqualified edge {A2, B3}. As distinct independent noise
bits z2, z3, z4, z7, z8, z0 will not reveal anything and the common noise bits z5, z6 carry the same
secret bits, security is guaranteed.
The converse proof for all linear schemes is presented in Section 5. We give an intuitive ex-
planation of the idea here. A finer argument of the contradiction in Example 2 is required. For
this explanation, let us assume the noise space of any two vertices from a qualified edge share
exactly L dimensions in common (relaxation of this assumption is deferred to the full proof in
Section 5). That is, the noise spaces of A1 and B1 share L dimensions (this space is denoted as
γ1), and B1 and A2 share L dimensions (denote this space as γ2). Now how many dimensions
do A1, B1, A2 have in common? γ1 and γ2 are two subspaces of the noise space of B1 such that
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dim(γ1 ∩ γ2) ≥ dim(γ1) + dim(γ2)−N = 2L−N . Proceeding with this argument along the quali-
fied path (A1, B1, A2, B2, A3, B3), we find that the noise spaces of A1, B1, A2, B2, A3, B3 must share
5L − 4N dimensions. We argue that such a common overlap cannot exist, so 5L − 4N ≤ 0 and
Rlinear = L/(2N) ≤ 2/5. To set up the proof by contradiction, let us assume that all 6 noise spaces
share a common dimension (denoted as γ). As the path (B2, A1, B3, A2) is unqualified, the signal
space of γ must fully overlap as otherwise information about the secret will be revealed. This means
that in the noise overlap of {A2, B2}, some signal is overlapped and does not contribute useful in-
formation of the secret. As the noise space of A2, B2 shares exactly L dimensions and in the overlap
γ is useless, we cannot decode the L-symbol secret from {A2, B2}, arriving at the contradiction
that {A2, B2} is a qualified edge. The intersections of more than 2 spaces have no correspondence
to entropy terms such that the above linear argument may not hold in the information theoretic
sense (i.e., non-linear codes might achieve a higher rate). Note that the achievable scheme in Fig. 3
is designed following the overlap insights provided by the linear converse idea.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
4.1 Only if part
Consider any non-degenerate CDS instance, described by the characteristic graph Gf (V,E). We
show that if the half-rate feasibility condition in Theorem 1 is violated, then rate 1/2 is not achiev-
able. To set up the proof by contradiction, let us assume that R = L/2N = 1/2 is achievable, i.e.,
N = L. As a result, each signal that is connected to a qualified edge and the noise used in such a
signal must have entropy L. This result is stated in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Signal and Noise Size) When R = 1/2, for any signal v ∈ V such that there exists
u ∈ V such that {v, u} is a qualified edge, we have
H(v) = H(v|S) = L. (6)
Proof: First, consider the “≤” direction.
H(v|S) ≤ H(v) ≤ N = L. (7)
Second, consider the “≥” direction. As the CDS instance is non-degenerate, for any vertex w, there
exists a vertex w′ such that {w,w′} is unqualified. From the security constraint (4), we have
I(w,w′;S) = 0 ⇒ I(w;S) = 0 (8)
(w can by any vertex) ⇒ I(v;S) = I(u;S) = 0. (9)
Consider now the qualified edge {v, u}. From the correctness constraint (3), we have
H(S|v, u) = 0 ⇒ L (1)= H(S) = I(v, u;S) (9)= I(v;S|u) ≤ H(v) (9)= H(v|S). (10)
The proof is thus complete.
Next, we consider any qualified edge and show that the noise appeared in both end vertices of
the qualified edge has joint entropy L, same as the entropy of the noise appeared in each vertex by
itself. In other words, the noise must fully align.
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Lemma 2 (Noise Alignment for Qualified Edge) When R = 1/2, for any qualified edge {v, u},
we have
H(v, u|S) = L. (11)
Proof: On the one hand, we have
H(v, u|S) = H(v, u, S)−H(S) (12)
(3)
= H(v, u)−H(S) (13)
(1)
≤ H(v) +H(u)− L (14)
(6)
= L+ L− L = L. (15)
On the other hand, we have
H(v, u|S) ≥ H(v|S) (6)= L. (16)
The proof is now complete.
In the following lemma, we generalize the noise alignment phenomenon from qualified edges to
(any induced subgraph of) qualified components.
Lemma 3 (Noise Alignment for Qualified Component) When R = 1/2, for any qualified
component Q with vertex set VQ ⊂ V , we have
∀Vq ⊂ VQ, H(Vq|S) = H(VQ|S) = L. (17)
Proof: We first prove the “≥” direction.
H(VQ|S) ≥ H(Vq|S) ≥ H(v|S) for any v ∈ Vq (18)
(6)
= L. (19)
Second, we prove the “≤” direction and complete the proof. Denote VQ = {v1, v2, · · · , vQ}. Start
with any qualified edge {vi1 , vi2}, i1, i2 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Q} in the qualified component Q. As Q is a
qualified component, there must exist a vertex vi3 ∈ VQ and a vertex from vi1 , vi2 (suppose it is
vi2 without loss of generality) such that {vi2 , vi3} is a qualified edge. From the sub-modularity
property of entropy functions, we have
H(vi1 , vi2 |S) +H(vi2 , vi3 |S) ≥ H(vi1 , vi2 , vi3 |S) +H(vi2 |S) (20)
(6)(11)
=⇒ L+ L ≥ H(vi1 , vi2 , vi3 |S) + L (21)
(19)⇒ H(vi1 , vi2 , vi3 |S) = L. (22)
Then similarly, as Q is a qualified component, there must exist a vertex vi4 ∈ VQ such that {v, vi4}
is a qualified edge, where v is one vertex from vi1 , vi2 , vi3 . With a similar proof as above, we have
H(vi1 , vi2 , vi3 , vi4 |S) = L⇒ · · · ⇒ H(VQ|S) = L⇒ H(Vq|S) ≤ H(VQ|S) = L. (23)
We now proceed to the signal alignment phenomenon. We show that within a qualified com-
ponent, any two vertices v, u that form an unqualified edge must produce exactly the same signal,
i.e., the joint entropy of v, u is L, which is the same as that of any individual v or u by itself.
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Lemma 4 (Signal Alignment for Unqualified Edge within Qualified Component) When
R = 1/2, for any unqualified edge {v, u} that is within a qualified component Q, we have
H(v, u) = L. (24)
Proof: Note that both end vertices of the unqualified edge {v, u} belong to the vertex set of the
qualified component Q. Combining the security constraint (4) and (17), we have
H(v, u)
(4)
= H(v, u|S) (17)= L. (25)
In the following lemma, we generalize the signal alignment phenomenon from unqualified edges
to unqualified paths.
Lemma 5 (Signal Alignment for Unqualified Path within Qualified Component) When
R = 1/2, for any unqualified path within a qualified component Q, ({v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, · · · , {vP−1, vP }),
we have
H(v1, vP ) ≤ L. (26)
Proof: Equipped with what has been established, the proof follows from a simple recursive
application of the sub-modularity property of entropy functions.
H(v1, v2) +H(v2, v3) + · · ·H(vP−1, vP ) ≥ H(v1, v2, · · · , vP ) +H(v2) +H(v3) + · · ·+H(vP−1)
(24)(6)⇒ (P − 1)L ≥ H(v1, vP ) + (P − 2)L ⇒ H(v1, vP ) ≤ L. (27)
After establishing the above lemmas, we are ready to present where is the contradiction. As
the half-rate feasibility condition is violated, there must exist an internal qualified edge (denoted
as {v1, vP }) in an unqualified path ({v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, · · · , {vP−1, vP }) and the unqualified path is
within a qualified component Q. From the correctness constraint (4) of the qualified edge {v1, vP },
we have
L
(26)
≥ H(v1, vP ) (3)= H(v1, vP , S) = H(S) +H(v1, vP |S) (1)(11)= L+ L. (28)
So L ≥ 2L, and we have arrived at the contradiction. The proof of the only if part is thus complete.
Remark 1 The above proof is based on assuming that R = 1/2 and then arguing by contradiction.
We may bound the terms appeared more carefully and obtain a stronger bound on R, R ≤ R, where
R is strictly smaller than 1/2, i.e., R = 1/2 − δ for a positive constant δ. We do not choose
to provide a concrete value of R, because 1) such a proof will be more lengthy and ideas are less
clear, 2) and the bound produced by this procedure may not be the tightest bound possible from all
sub-modularity constraints (see Remark 3).
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4.2 If part
We show that if the half-rate feasibility condition in Theorem 1 is satisfied, then the CDS capacity
is 1/2. We first prove that R ≤ 1/2 and then show that R = 1/2 is achievable.
The proof of R ≤ 1/2 is as follows. Consider any CDS instance that contains at least one
qualified edge {v, u}; otherwise all edges are unqualified, the problem is meaningless as the secret
is never disclosed. Further, the CDS instance is non-degenerate, so there exists an unqualified edge
{u,w}. From the security constraint (4), we have
I(u,w;S) = 0⇒ I(u;S) = 0. (29)
From the correctness constraint (3), we have
L
(1)
= H(S)
(3)
= I(S; v, u)
(29)
= I(S; v|u) ≤ H(v) ≤ N (30)
⇒ R = L/(2N) ≤ 1/2. (31)
We now present the coding scheme that achieves rate 1/2. The scheme is a generalization of
that presented in Example 1.
Consider any non-degenerate CDS instance, described by the characteristic graph Gf (V,E).
Suppose Gf (V,E) has M qualified components. A single vertex that is not connected to any qual-
ified edge is a (trivial) qualified component. Suppose within the mth,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M} qualified
component, there are Um unqualified components. Choose p as a prime number that is no fewer
than max(U1, U2, · · · , UM ). The secret S contains L = 1 symbol from the finite field Fp, denoted
as S = (s) and the noise Z contains LZ = M symbols from Fp, denoted as Z = (z1, z2, · · · , zM ).
Note that z1, · · · , zM are i.i.d. uniform symbols over Fp.
The signals are assigned as follows. Consider the mth qualified component Qm. We set
any signal v in the ith, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Um} unqualified component within Qm as s+ izm. (32)
To complete the proof of the achievable scheme, we show that the scheme is both correct and
secure. Consider the correctness constraint (3) first. A qualified edge must belong to one qualified
component. As the half-rate feasibility condition in Theorem 1 is satisfied, there is no internal
qualified edge, i.e., any qualified edge must belong to different unqualified components within a
qualified component. Consider any qualified edge {v, u} that is from qualified component Qm and
within Qm, suppose v belongs to the i
th unqualified component and u belongs to the jth unqualified
component. Note that j is not equal to i. From (32), we have
v = s+ izm, u = s+ jzm (33)
⇒ H(S|v, u) = H(s|s+ izm, s+ jzm) j 6=i= H(s|s, zm) = 0 (34)
so that the scheme is always correct.
Next consider the security constraint (4). Consider any unqualified edge {v, u}. We have the
following two cases.
1. {v, u} is from the same qualified component, say Qm. Note that any unqualified edge must
belong to the same unqualified component within Qm, say the i
th unqualified component.
From (32), we have
v = u = s+ izm (35)
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⇒ H(S|v, u) = H(s|s+ izm) = H(s, s+ izm)−H(s+ izm) = 1 = H(S) (36)
so that security is guaranteed.
2. {v, u} is from different qualified components. Suppose v is from Qm and u is from Qm′ ,
where m 6= m′. Further assume that v belongs to the ith unqualified component in Qm, and
u belongs to the jth unqualified component in Qm′ . From (32), we have
v = s+ izm, u = s+ jzm′ (37)
⇒ H(S|v, u) = H(s|s+ izm, s+ jzm′) (38)
= H(s, s+ izm, s+ jzm′)−H(s+ izm, s+ jzm′) (39)
= H(s, zm, zm′)−H(s+ izm, s+ jzm′) (40)
≥ H(s, zm, zm′)− 2 = 1 = H(S) (41)
so that H(S|v, u) = H(S) and security is guaranteed.
Randomness Cost Reduction
The above scheme uses M noise symbols in total. We show that 2 noise symbols are sufficient, i.e.,
we save M − 2 noise symbols and the randomness rate is improved from RZ = 1/M to RZ = 1/2.
This reduction is made possible by the following simple observation - each unqualified edge only
involves two vertices and each vertex only contains 1 noise symbol, so we only need to guarantee
these two noise symbols appeared (if different) are linearly independent and for this purpose, two
base noise symbols are sufficient as all other noise symbols can be generic linear combinations of
these two noise symbols. The detailed proof is presented next.
Choose p as a prime number such that p > max(U1, U2, · · · , UM ,M−2). The remaining proof is
the same as that above, except that z1, z2. · · · , zM are linear combinations of two base independent
uniform symbols z1, z2 (instead of being mutually independent).
z3 = z1 + z2, z4 = z1 + 2z2, · · · , zM = z1 + (M − 2)z2. (42)
The correctness constraint is not influenced as only the noise assignment is changed. The security
constraint continues to hold as we may easily verify that every step in (35) - (41) goes through
after we set (42).
Remark 2 While the characteristic graph of a CDS instance is bipartite, a closer inspection of the
proof of both the only if part and the if part reveals that the bipartite property is not used in the
proof. Therefore Theorem 1 holds also for non-bipartite characteristic graphs.
5 Proof of Theorem 2: Linear Converse
We show that for the CDS instance in Fig. 3, the rate for all linear schemes cannot be higher than
2/5. For a linear scheme, the signal v is a linear function of the secret S ∈ FL×1p and the noise
Z ∈ FLZ×1p . All secret and noise symbols are i.i.d. and uniform.
v = FvS + HvZ (43)
where Fv is an N × L matrix over Fp, and Hv is an N × LZ matrix over Fp.
13
We first establish two general properties that hold for all linear schemes. The first property
states that for any qualified edge, the overlap of the noise spaces cannot be fewer than L dimensions.
This property is stated in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 (Noise Alignment) For any linear scheme and for any qualified edge {v, u}, we have
dim(rowspan(Hv) ∩ rowspan(Hu)) ≥ L. (44)
Proof: For any non-degenerate setting, we know from (29) that any vertex must be independent
of the secret.
0 = I(S; v) = I(S; FvS + HvZ) ⇒ 0 = I(S; Fv(J , :)S + Hv(J , :)Z) (45)
where J ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , N} and for a matrix A, we use A(J , :) to denote the sub-matrix of A formed
by rows in the index set J . In words, (45) means that for linear schemes the secret space must be
fully covered by the noise space.
Denote dim(rowspan(Hv) ∩ rowspan(Hu)) by α. As Hv and Hu overlap in α dimensions, we
may assume without loss of generality (by a change of basis operation) that the first α rows of Hu
and Hv are the same, i.e., Hv(1 : α, :) = Hu(1 : α, :) , Hα. Further, we have that
The row vectors of Hα, Hv(α+ 1 : N, :) and Hu(α+ 1 : N, :) are linearly independent. (46)
To simplify the notation, we define
Fv(1 : α, :) , Fv1 , Fv(α+ 1, N, :) , Fv2 , (47)
Hv(α+ 1, N, :) , Hv2 . (48)
For the qualified edge {v, u}, the correctness constraint (3) requires that
L
(1)
= H(S) = I(S; v, u) (49)
= I(S; Fv1S + HαZ,Fu1S + HαZ,Fv2S + Hv2Z,Fu2S + Hu2Z) (50)
= I(S; (Fv1 − Fu1)S,Fu1S + HαZ,Fv2S + Hv2Z,Fu2S + Hu2Z) (51)
= I(S; Fu1S + HαZ,Fv2S + Hv2Z,Fu2S + Hu2Z)
+ I(S; (Fv1 − Fu1)S|Fu1S + HαZ,Fv2S + Hv2Z,Fu2S + Hu2Z) (52)
≤ H((Fv1 − Fu1)S) (53)
≤ α (54)
where (53) follows from the property that the first term of (52) is zero (proved in the following),
and the last step follows from the fact that (Fv1 − Fu1)S has at most α symbols.
To complete the proof of α ≥ L, we show that I(S; Fu1S+HαZ,Fv2S+Hv2Z,Fu2S+Hu2Z) = 0.
I(S; Fu1S + HαZ,Fv2S + Hv2Z,Fu2S + Hu2Z)
= H(Fu1S + HαZ,Fv2S + Hv2Z,Fu2S + Hu2Z)
− H(Fu1S + HαZ,Fv2S + Hv2Z,Fu2S + Hu2Z|S) (55)
≤ H(Fu1S + HαZ) +H(Fv2S + Hv2Z) +H(Fu2S + Hu2Z)
− H(HαZ,Hv2Z,Hu2Z) (56)
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(45)(46)
= H(HαZ) +H(Hv2Z) +H(Hu2Z)−H(HαZ)−H(Hv2Z)−H(Hu2Z) = 0. (57)
As mutual information is non-negative, the proof of Lemma 6 is now complete.
The second property states that for any unqualified edge, within the noise overlapping space,
the signal space must fully overlap. This property is stated in Lemma 7.
Lemma 7 (Signal Alignment) For any linear scheme and for any unqualified edge {v, u}, we
have
∀J ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , N}, Hv(J , :) = Hu(J , :) ⇒ Fv(J , :) = Fu(J , :). (58)
Proof: For the unqualified edge {v, u}, the security constraint (4) imposes that
0 = I(S; v, u) = I(S; FvS + HvZ,FuS + HuZ)
≥ I(S; Fv(J , :)S + Hv(J , :)Z,Fu(J , :)S + Hu(J , :)Z) (59)
≥ I(S; (Fv(J , :)− Fu(J , :))S + (Hv(J , :)−Hu(J , :))Z). (60)
Now suppose. Hv(J , :) = Hu(J , :). Plugging this condition into the equality above, we have
0 ≥ I(S; (Fv(J , :)− Fu(J , :))S) ⇒ Fv(J , :) = Fu(J , :) (61)
and the proof is complete.
Equipped with the above two lemmas, we are ready to consider the CDS instance in Fig. 3.
We first consider the qualified path P = ({A1, B1}, {B1, A2}, {A2, B2}, {B2, A3}, {A3, B3}) and see
what is the dimension of the common overlap for the noise spaces of A1, B1, A2, B2, A3, B3. For
any given linear scheme, we find the noise overlap of every qualified edge in P and simplify the
notation as follows.
dim(rowspan(Hv) ∩ rowspan(Hu)) , αvu, e.g., dim(rowspan(HA1) ∩ rowspan(HB1)) = αA1B1 (62)
and we identify 5 constants αA1B1 , αB1A2 , αA2B2 , αB2A3 , αA3B3 . Similarly, we denote
dim(rowspan(Hv) ∩ rowspan(Hu) ∩ rowspan(Hw)) = αvuw, etc. (63)
and wish to characterize αA1B1A2B2A3B3 , i.e., the overlap of 6 noise spaces. Consider αA1B1A2 .
αA1B1A2 = dim
(
rowspan(HA1) ∩ rowspan(HB1) ∩ rowspan(HA2)
)
= dim
(
(rowspan(HA1) ∩ rowspan(HB1)) ∩ (rowspan(HB1) ∩ rowspan(HA2))
)
(64)
≥ dim ((rowspan(HA1) ∩ rowspan(HB1))) + dim ((rowspan(HB1) ∩ rowspan(HA2)))
− dim(rowspan(HB1)) (65)
= αA1B1 + αB1A2 −N (66)
where (65) follows from the fact that both the overlap of the row span of HA1 , HB1 and the overlap
of the row span of HB1 , HA2 are subspaces of HB1 , and within a vector space of dimension α, two
subspaces of dimension α1, α2 must overlap in a space of dimension at least α1 + α2 − α. (66) is
due to the fact that we may assume without loss of generality dim(rowspan(HB1)) = N , i.e., the
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noise space has full rank. This is argued as follows. Suppose the matrix HB1 does not have full
row rank, i.e., there exists a row of HB1 that is a linear combination of other rows, say HB1(1, :).
From (45), we know that B1 is independent of S, so the precoding vector of the secret FB1(1, :)
must also be the same linear combination of other rows of FB1 . In other words, the first row of
the signal B1 is a deterministic function of the other rows of B1 and contributes no entropy to B1
(thus can be eliminated without loss). So we may only consider achievable schemes so that for any
signal, the precoding matrix for the noise has full rank4, N .
We proceed similarly to the overlap of 4 noise spaces, αA1B1A2B2 . Interpreting this overlap as
the overlap of two spaces, i.e., the row span of HA1 ,HB1 ,HA2 and the row space of HA2 ,HB2 ,
within one space, i.e., the row space of HA2 , we have
αA1B1A2B2 ≥ αA1B1A2 + αA2B2 −N (67)
(66)
≥ αA1B1 + αB1A2 + αA2B2 − 2N (68)
Similarly, αA1B1A2B2A3 ≥ αA1B1 + αB1A2 + αA2B2 + αB2A3 − 3N (69)
αA1B1A2B2A3B3 ≥ αA1B1 + αB1A2 + αA2B2 + αB2A3 + αA3B3 − 4N , α∗. (70)
In other words, the 6 noise spaces overlap in a space of dimension at least α∗ so that we may assume
without loss of generality that the first α∗ rows of the noise precoding matrix ofA1, B1, A2, B2, A3, B3
are the same.
HA1(1 : α
∗, :) = HB1(1 : α
∗, :) = HA2(1 : α
∗, :) = HB2(1 : α
∗, :) = HA3(1 : α
∗, :) = HB3(1 : α
∗, :).(71)
We next consider the unqualified path Pu = ({B2, A1}, {A1, B3}, {B3, A2}), where every vertex
belongs to the qualified path P considered above. The overlap of the 6 noise spaces must be a
subspace of the overlap of the noise space of any unqualified edge. Applying Lemma 7, i.e., (58) to
the 3 unqualified edges in Pu, we have
HB2(1 : α
∗, :) = HA1(1 : α
∗, :) ⇒ FB2(1 : α∗, :) = FA1(1 : α∗, :) (72)
HA1(1 : α
∗, :) = HB3(1 : α
∗, :) ⇒ FA1(1 : α∗, :) = FB3(1 : α∗, :) (73)
HB3(1 : α
∗, :) = HA2(1 : α
∗, :) ⇒ FB3(1 : α∗, :) = FA2(1 : α∗, :) (74)
⇒ HB2(1 : α∗, :) = HA2(1 : α∗, :), FB2(1 : α∗, :) = FA2(1 : α∗, :). (75)
The final step is to consider the internal qualified edge {A2, B2}, where we have the noise and
signal alignment constraint (75). The correctness constraint (3) requires that
L
(1)
= H(S) = I(S;A2, B2). (76)
Following the proof of (53), we have
L ≤ H((FA2(1 : αA2B2 , :)− FB2(1 : αA2B2 , :))S) (77)
(75)
= H((FA2(α
∗ + 1 : αA2B2 , :)− FB2(α∗ + 1 : αA2B2 , :))S) (78)
≤ αA2B2 − α∗ (79)
4The noise precoding matrix has size N × LZ , where N ≤ LZ . Note that if otherwise N > LZ , then the rows of
the noise cannot be linearly independent, and we have a similar situation where some row is a linear combination of
other rows and we can follow the same line to argue that this row of signal is redundant.
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(70)
= αA2B2 − (αA1B1 + αB1A2 + αA2B2 + αB2A3 + αA3B3 − 4N) (80)
= 4N − (αA1B1 + αB1A2 + αB2A3 + αA3B3) (81)
(44)
≤ 4N − 4L (82)
⇒ R = L/(2N) ≤ 4N/5× 1/(2N) = 2/5. (83)
The linear converse proof is thus complete.
Remark 3 The information theoretic capacity of the CDS instance in Fig. 3 is an interesting open
problem, which might be challenging. While the linear capacity is characterized in Theorem 2 to
be 2/5, the best information theoretic converse with all Shannon type information inequalities [40]
(sub-modularity constraints) is 5/12, found by computer programs [41, 42]. Therefore, if the lin-
ear scheme of Theorem 2 is information theoretically optimal, then we need non-Shannon type
information inequalities to establish the converse; if the best converse with only Shannon-type in-
formation inequalities is information theoretically optimal, then we need non-linear codes to achieve
it. Therefore, for the CDS instance in Fig. 3 with only 6 nodes and defined by only 8 variables
(if only capacity is of concern, this can be reduced to 7 by eliminating the noise variable), either
non-linear codes are necessary for achievability schemes or non-Shannon inequalities are necessary
for converse arguments; further it is possible that both are required to establish the capacity.
For the best converse of 5/12 with only Shannon-type information inequalities, we have not
found a proof by hand. Through tightening the steps in the proof of Theorem 1 in a non-trivial
manner (details omitted as no new insights emerge), we can obtain a converse bound of 3/7, while
a naive application of the inequalities in Theorem 1 induces a looser converse bound of 11/24.
6 Conclusion
The conditional disclosure of secrets problem is studied from an information theoretic capacity
perspective. A noise and signal alignment approach is used to identify all best case scenarios where
the capacity is the highest, and the linear capacity of the scenario that minimally violates the
best case criterion. A number of interesting related questions remain open, among which a few
are mentioned below. The achievable scheme of Theorem 1 uses scalar codes (the secret has only
1 symbol) while if block codes are used, the field size required can be reduced and the tradeoff
between block-length and field size is an interesting problem. As another example, while the best
case scenarios are fully characterized, we know very little about the worst case scenarios, i.e., for
which problem instances, the capacity is small and how small can it be? It is desirable to establish
capacity approximations and exact capacity results for various classes of problem instances (e.g., in
terms of the characteristic graphs). We have focused exclusively on the metric of capacity in this
work, while other metrics are also interesting, e.g., the capacity region, the maximum randomness
rate and the randomness constrained capacity. Extensions to include a larger number of users
(beyond 2 users holding the secret) and more secrets (beyond a single secret) look fertile. To sum
up, this work represents an interesting initial step towards using signal overlap analysis and tools in
information theory to understand the fundamental limits of multi-user primitives in cryptography,
for which the potential remains promising while the topic is widely under-explored.
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